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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates how subjects determine minimum selling prices for lotteries. We 
design an experiment where subjects have at every moment an incentive to state their 
minimum selling price and to adjust the price if they believe that the price that they stated 
initially was not optimal. We observe frequent and sizeable price adjustments. We find that 
random pricing models can not explain the observed price patterns. We show that earlier 
prices contain information about future price adjustments. We propose a model of 
Stochastic Pricing that offers an intuitive explanation for these price adjustment patterns. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper investigates how individuals determine minimum selling prices for 
lotteries. In a standard lottery pricing experiments, we observe one price for each lottery.1 
The price that is observed by the experimenter is the one that the subject enters after some 
time of deliberation. This paper tries to shed some light on how does this deliberation 
process works and on how individuals determine minimum selling prices. 
We ran an experiment where 60 subjects had to price various lotteries. The 
objective of the experiment was to observe the deliberation process, i.e., to observe how 
the minimum selling price evolves/emerges over time. Therefore, we designed the 
experiment such that subjects had during a pricing task at every moment an incentive to 
state their minimum selling price and to adjust the price if they believe that the price that 
they stated initially was not optimal.  
To achieve this, we use the following experimental design: The computer screen 
displayed the lottery and a list of prices spaced equally apart between zero and the highest 
outcome of the lottery (see screenshot in the appendix). Subjects were asked to indicate 
their minimum selling price by clicking on one of the prices on the list. Subjects were told 
that the question is terminated after some randomly determined time (between 10 and 30 
seconds) and that the last price is used to determine the payoffs. If subjects did not click on 
a price before the question was terminated, they received a payoff of zero if the question 
was selected to determine their payoffs. Subjects could adjust the price as often as they 
wanted. The computer program recorded the order in which prices are clicked on. The last 
price that a subject clicked on was used to determine her payoff by the standard Becker-
                                                 
1 A large number of experiments elicit certainty equivalents via a sequence of binary choices (e.g. Tversky 
and Kahneman 1992). In the context of this paper, we do not consider these experiments as pricing tasks, 
since subjects do not state prices, Instead, certainty equivalents are inferred from the observed binary choices. 
These experiments ask subjects to make several binary choices but not to price lotteries. 
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DeGroot-Marschak-procedure (Becker et al. 1964). Hence, subjects had an incentive to 
state minimum selling price at any time (except for first ten seconds). 
We observed that in 78% of the tasks, subjects adjusted their price at least once, 
in 53% of the tasks, subjects adjusted the price at least twice. Subjects did not only adjust 
prices frequently, they also made quite substantial adjustments within a short period of 
time. In 35% of all cases, subjects adjusted their prices by more than 10% of the highest 
outcome of the lottery. We interpret our results as evidence that decision making takes 
time and that subjects gradually refine their decision/answer over time until they arrive 
after sufficient deliberation at a final price.  
The vast majority of decision theories is concerned with explaining and 
predicting prices for lotteries but does not discuss how these prices are determined (a 
notable exception is the computational model of Johnson and Busemeyer (2005)). Since 
we observe that subjects adjust their price, the question arises whether these price 
adjustments are random or whether the observed price adjustment patterns allow to draw 
conclusions on how subjects determine the minimum selling price of a lottery. We find that 
random pricing models where subjects receive iid. draws from some distribution of prices 
can not explain the price patterns that we observe in the experiment. Instead, we show that 
earlier prices contain information about future price adjustments. 
Blavatskyy and Köhler (2009) propose a model of how individuals price lotteries 
that models explicitly the process that subjects use to determine minimum selling prices. 
The model considers subjects whose preferences are described by a random utility model. 
Subjects determine the minimum selling price of a lottery via a sequence of hypothetical 
binary comparisons between the lottery and different monetary amounts. Depending on 
whether the amount or the lottery is preferred, the subject decreases or increases the 
amount to which the lottery is compared.  
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This model of Stochastic Pricing can explain the price adjustment patterns that 
we observe. We run a Monte-Carlo simulation to compare the predictions of the model 
with the experimental results. The model predicts frequent and sizeable price adjustments. 
The pricing patterns that are generated by the model match the patterns that we observe in 
the experiment. Additionally, the model offers a simple explanation for why the price 
adjustment patterns differ for lotteries that yield the high outcome with small and large 
probability. 
To achieve our objective that subjects had at every moment an incentive to state 
their minimum selling price we used a form of ‘continuous’ time pressure. Since subjects 
did not know when the task was terminated, they had an incentive to state a price quickly 
and adjust the price if they believed that the price that they stated earlier was not optimal. 
While these procedure is related to experiments that analyse decision making under time 
pressure (e.g. Wright, 1974; Ben Zur and Breznitz, 1981; Busemeyer, 1985, 1993), it is not 
our primary aim to analyse how time pressure affects decisions. Instead, we use time 
pressure only as a tool to observe how the minimum selling price evolves/emerges over 
time. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
design and implementation of the experiment. Section 3 presents the experimental results. 
Section 4 shows that random pricing models cannot accommodate the experimental results. 
Section 5 shows that the patterns of price adjustments observed in the experiment are 
consistent with a simple procedural model of stochastic pricing, where individuals search 
for their minimum selling price through a sequence of binary comparisons. Section 6 
concludes. 
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2 Experimental Design and Implementation 
We used the 6 lotteries that are shown in Table 1. All lotteries have only two 
outcomes and the lowest outcome is zero. Outcomes are in Swiss Francs. At the time of the 
experiment, one Swiss Franc was approximately $0.83 or €0.61. Lotteries were described 
and subsequently played out in terms of the number of red and black cards in a box that 
contains 100 cards. The computer screen displayed the lottery and a list of prices spaced 
equally apart between zero and the highest outcome of the lottery (see screenshot in the 
appendix). The number of prices was chosen such that all prices on the list are integers. 
 
Lottery L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 
Outcome 1x  150 120 90 96 60 84 
Probability 1p  0.15 0.22 0.35 0.45 0.68 0.85 
Outcome 2x  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Probability 2p  0.85 0.78 0.65 0.55 0.32 0.15 
# of prices on list 31 31 31 33 31 29 
Table 1 Lotteries (Outcomes are in Swiss Francs) 
The objective of the experiment was to observe how the minimum selling price 
evolves over time. Therefore, we designed the experiment such that subjects had at every 
moment an incentive to state their minimum selling price and to adjust the price if they 
believe that the price that they stated initially was not optimal.  
Subjects were asked to indicate their minimum selling price by clicking on one of 
the prices on the list. Subjects were told that the question is terminated after some 
randomly determined time (between 10 and 30 seconds) and that the last price is used to 
determine the payoffs. If subjects did not click on a price before the question was 
terminated, they received a payoff of zero if the question was selected to determine their 
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payoffs. Subjects could adjust the price as often as they wanted. The computer program 
recorded the order in which prices are clicked on. The last price that a subject clicked on 
was used to determine her payoff by the standard Becker-DeGroot-Marschak-procedure. 
If one of these tasks was selected to determine the earnings, a random price was 
drawn from the interval between zero and the highest outcome of the lottery. If the last 
price that the subject entered was higher than the price that was drawn, she would play the 
lottery. Otherwise she would sell the lottery and receive the price that was drawn. 
When subjects had to play one of these tasks, they first received a notification. 
The notification told them that they would receive a payoff of zero if they did not enter a 
price before the task was terminated. After the notification, one of the lotteries and the 
corresponding list of prices appeared on the screen and time started running. 
2.1 Implementation of the experiment 
The experiment was conducted in the experimental laboratory of the Institute for 
Empirical Research in Economics at the University of Zürich. Sixty undergraduates (35 
male and 25 female) from a variety of majors participated in the experiment. The average 
age was 22. There were two sessions with 30 subjects in each session. At the beginning of 
the experiment, subjects received a copy of the instructions (a translation can be found in 
the Appendix). Instructions included screenshots for the different tasks. Additionally, the 
experimenter read aloud the instructions. The experiment lasted about 45 minutes (plus 30 
minutes to explain the instructions). The experiment was programmed with z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). The six pricing tasks that are analyzed in this paper were presented to 
subjects in a random order intermixed with 66 other decision problems that will be 
analyzed elsewhere (cf. Blavatskyy and Köhler, 2009). 
We used a random lottery incentive scheme and physical randomization devices. 
At the end of the experiment each subject drew a card from a box with cards numbered 
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from 1 to 72 (total number of decision problems). The number on the card determined the 
decision problem which was used to compute the payoff of the subject. If the subject had 
to play a risky lottery, she had to draw a second card from a box with the corresponding 
distribution of red and black cards (we used standard playing cards). Subjects drew the 
second card outside the main laboratory to preserve the anonymity of payments. 
Subjects received a 10 CHF show-up fee and whatever they earned in the 
experiment. Average earnings were 43.9 CHF (approx. $40 or €27). The lowest earning 
was 10 CHF, the highest was 133.8 CHF. At the end of the experiment, the subjects were 
asked to complete a short socio-demographic questionnaire. 
3 Results 
We first present some descriptive statistics which summarize the results of the 
experiment. Figure 1 presents the distribution of the number of price adjustments that 
subjects made in the experiment (across 6 lotteries and 60 subjects). In 78% of the tasks, 
subjects adjusted their price at least once, in 53% of the tasks, subjects adjusted the price at 
least twice. 
 
Figure 1 Percentage of subjects stating as many prices as indicated on the horizontal axis 
0% 
5% 
10%
15%
20%
25%
1 Price 2 Prices 3 Prices 4 Prices 5 Prices 6 Prices 7 and more 
Number of prices
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Subjects could adjust their price at zero cost. The last price that was entered was 
used to determine the payoffs. Since the tasks were terminated at some randomly selected 
time, subjects had an incentive to state the best estimate of their minimum selling price at 
every point in time.2 In all tasks, subjects stated at least one price before the task was 
terminated. Table 2 shows for each lottery the time limit and the average number of prices 
that subjects state. Subjects adjust their price more frequently if they have more time to do 
so. This indicates that the determination of the minimum selling price takes some time. 
Lottery L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 
Time Limit (sec.) 19 27 17 22 21 18 
Average # of prices 
per subject 
2.87 3.9 3 3.2 3 2.6 
Table 2 Average number of stated prices 
Subjects did not only adjust prices frequently, they also made quite substantial 
adjustments within a short period of time. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the 
discrepancy between the maximum and the minimum price that a subject states for a 
lottery (across all lotteries and subjects). The discrepancy is measured in percent of the 
highest outcome of the lottery. Figure 2 shows that in 35% of all cases the subjects 
adjusted their prices by more than 10% of the highest outcome of the lottery.3 
                                                 
2 Subjects knew that the pricing task was terminated after ten seconds at the earliest. 
3 Subjects had to choose prices from a list of prices that were spaced equally apart. The distance between 
prices on the list was between 3.125% and 3.57% of the highest lottery outcome. The spike in the number of 
price adjustments between 5 and 10% of the highest lottery outcome is caused by the spacing of prices on the 
list. 
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Figure 2 Discrepancy between the maximum and the minimum stated price for a 
lottery 
Among the 360 tasks (6 lotteries and 60 subjects), there are five tasks where a 
subject states ten or more prices. Subject 5 stated a sequence of 13 prices for lottery 3 
where all prices alternate between 33 and 36. Subject 14 stated a sequence of 17 prices for 
both lottery 2 and lottery 3. For lottery 2, after the 4th price, prices alternate between 20 
and 24. For lottery 3, after the 2nd price, prices alternate between 21 and 24. Across all 
lotteries, subjects 5 and 14 adjusted their prices more frequently than any other subject. 
Subject 44 stated 10 prices for lottery 2 where the last 8 prices alternate between 28 and 
32. Subject 53 stated 11 prices for lottery 2 where all prices alternate between 20 and 24. 4  
Next we look at the patterns of price adjustments. Let ,..., 21 pp  be the first, 
second, etc., price that a subject states. We classify all pricing patterns where subjects 
made at least three clicks into five classes: 
•  “Monotone”:  Either 1+< tt pp  for all t  or 1+> tt pp  for all t . 
                                                 
4 There is only one observation where a subject states the same price repeatedly without stating a different 
price in between (for lottery 1, subject 14 states the prices 45, 20, 25, 20, 20, 20). Obviously, stating a price 
repeatedly has no effect on payoffs. To simplify notation we treat this sequence as 45, 20, 25, 20.  
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•  “Oscillating”: 2+= tt pp  and 1+≠ tt pp  for all t . 
• “Fine-tuning”: A non-monotone pricing pattern where the following holds: If 
tt pp <−1  then 1−> ts pp  for all ts ≥ .  If tt pp >−1  then 1−< ts pp  for all ts ≥ .  
• “Weak fine-tuning”: A non-oscillating pricing pattern where the following holds: If 
tt pp <−1  then 1−≥ ts pp  for all ts ≥ .  If tt pp >−1  then 1−≤ ts pp  for all ts ≥ . And 
at least one inequality holds with equality. 
• “Jumping”:  All other pricing patterns. 
Figure 3 in the Appendix gives examples for the different pricing patterns. Note 
that weak fine-tuning patterns can not be observed if a subject states less than four prices. 
Table 3 list the distribution of observed pricing patterns given the number of prices that 
subjects state. 
Price adjustment 
patterns 
Number of stated prices 
Total 
3 4 5 6 7 or more 
Monotone 35 17 3 3 0 58 
Oscillating 10 9 2 3 2 26 
Fine-tuning 17 14 7 0 0 38 
Weak fine-tuning - 16 10 6 1 33 
Jumping 2 6 8 7 11 34 
Total 64 62 30 19 14 189 
Table 3 The frequency of price adjustment patterns in the experiment 
Table 3 shows that pricing patterns suggest that subjects search for the optimal 
minimum selling price. Note that it is not surprising that the frequency of monotone 
pricing patterns decreases if subjects state more prices and that the frequency of jumping 
patterns increases. Consider the first n-1 prices of a pattern with n prices. If the first n-1 
prices are monotone and increasing, then the complete pattern is monotone if and only if 
the last price is larger than all other prices. But if the first n-1 prices constitute a jumping 
pattern, then the complete pattern is jumping regardless of the last price. 
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4 Model of Random Pricing 
In our experiment, we observe that in 82% of cases, subjects state a price and 
later adjust the price. The vast majority of decision theories is concerned with explaining 
and predicting prices for lotteries but does not discuss how these prices are determined. 
Since we observe that subjects adjust their price, the question arises whether these price 
adjustments are random or whether the observed price adjustments allow to draw 
conclusions on how subjects determine the minimum selling price of a lottery.  
In this section, we analyze whether a general class of random pricing models can 
explain the price patterns that we observe in the experiment. Since we observe that subjects 
click on several prices, we consider random pricing models that generate a sequence of 
minimum selling prices. Recall that in our experiment, subjects can only state prices from 
the list of possible prices. Hence we assume that minimum selling prices are drawn from 
the list of possible prices. 
Definition 1: A random pricing model generates a sequence ,..., 21 cc  of 
minimum selling prices where ,..., 21 cc  are independent and identically distributed random 
variables. 
In section 3, we classify five different pricing patterns. Without additional 
assumptions on the distribution of prices, random pricing models generate testable 
predictions only with respect to the relative probability of monotone, fine-tuning and 
jumping price patterns (when all prices in the sequence are different). The relative 
probability that a monotone sequence is observed is equal to the probability that a 
monotone sequence is observed divided by the probability that a monotone, fine-tuning or 
jumping sequence is observed. The relative probabilities of fine-tuning and jumping 
sequences are defined in the same way. 
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Proposition 1. Consider a sequence of n≥2 different prices. If the sequence is 
generated by a random pricing model, then the relative probability of monotone sequences 
is 2/n!, the relative probability of fine-tuning sequences is (2n-1-2)/n!, and the relative 
probability of jumping sequences is 1-2n-1/n!. 
The proof is in the Appendix. 
Table 4 shows the frequency of monotone, fine-tuning and jumping pricing 
patterns where all prices are different. Column 2-4 lists the frequency of pricing patterns 
for all pricing patterns that consist of exactly three, four, and five prices.5 Among pricing 
patterns with seven or more prices, we do not observe monotone, fine-tuning or jumping 
pricing patterns where all prices are different. The probabilities that are predicted by 
Proposition 1 are in parentheses. The null-hypothesis is that probabilities are generated by 
a random pricing model as described by Proposition 1. Test statistics for pricing patterns 
with three or four prices refer to Pearson’s Chi-squared test. Since there are only few 
observations for pricing patterns with five or six prices, the p-value is computed by a 
multinomial test. 
Price adjustment 
pattern 
Number of prices in a sequence (n) 
3 4 5 6 
Monotone 35  (0.33) 17  (0.08) 3  (0.02) 3  (0.003) 
Fine-tuning 17  (0.33) 14  (0.25) 7  (0.12) 0  (0.042) 
Jumping 2  (0.33) 4  (0.67) 2  (0.87) 0  (0.956) 
χ2-test (p-value) 30.33 87.17 (1.07*e-08) (2.14*e-8) 
Table 4 Actual frequency (predicted probability) of monotone, fine-tuning and 
jumping price adjustment patterns where all prices are different. 
                                                 
5 If there are only two prices, then either both prices are the same or the sequence is monotone. Hence, the 
shortest price sequence where it is possible to observe monotone as well as fine-tuning and jumping patterns 
consists of three prices. 
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The prediction of Proposition 1 is strongly rejected by our experimental data for 
sequences with six or less prices, as shown in Table 4. Hence, random pricing models can 
not explain the price patterns that we observe in the experiment. Intuitively, random 
pricing models predict that future price adjustments do not depend on the past history but 
we observe in the experiment that earlier prices contain information about future price 
adjustments. 
5 A Model of Stochastic Pricing 
Blavatskyy and Köhler (2009) propose the following model of stochastic pricing. 
Each individual is characterized by a finite set Π of rational preference relations on the 
space of lotteries ℒ and a probability measure η that is defined on the power set of Π. We 
denote the elements of Π by ≿ρ ∈ Π . Preferences are described by a pair (η, Π). If an 
individual faces a binary choice problem, she draws a preference relation ≿ρ ∈ Π with 
probability η({≿ρ}) and chooses according to the realized ≿ρ.  
To determine the minimum selling price of a lottery, the individual uses a 
sequence of binary comparisons where the lottery is compared to different monetary 
amounts. The sequence of comparisons starts with some amount that is drawn at random 
from the set of possible prices. If the lottery is preferred over an amount, then the 
individual concludes that the minimum selling price should be higher. Hence the amount is 
increased by Δ and a new comparison is made. Similar, if the amount is preferred over the 
lottery, then the amount is decreased by Δ and a new comparison is made. This model of 
stochastic pricing does not only predict the minimum selling price that individuals state for 
a lottery but it also describes the procedure how individuals determine the minimum 
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selling price. Thus, this model has the potential for explaining the patterns of price 
adjustments that we observed in our experiment. 
In our experiment, subjects have to select a minimum selling price from a list of 
equally spaced prices. Hence the set of possible prices SL consists of all prices on the list.6 
Since subjects have to select a minimum selling price from SL, there is no need for 
comparing the lottery to some price that is not in SL. Thus, the step size Δ>0 by which the 
amount is adjusted has to be a multiple of the distance between prices in SL. 
Let the subscript t denote the number of the comparison. If an individual is asked 
to state the minimum selling price PL ∈ SL for a lottery L ∈ ℒ, then she uses the following 
procedure P: 
1) Draw an amount x∈SL at random. 
2) With probability γt∈(0,1] the sequence of comparisons stops and PL = x. Otherwise, 
draw a preference relation ≿ρ ∈ Π  according to probability measure η. 
3) If x ~ρ L, then PL = x. If x ≻ρ L (if L ≻ρ x) then step 2 is repeated where x is 
replaced by max{ x -Δ, min SL} (by min{x+Δ, max SL}). 
 
The idea behind the procedure is that individuals use a sequence of binary 
comparisons to determine the minimum selling price and that outcomes of earlier 
comparisons matter in the sense that they determine which amount is compared to the 
lottery in the next comparison. 
In the experiment, subjects have an incentive to state the best estimate of their 
minimum selling price at every point in time, because the pricing task may be terminated at 
any point in time. Therefore, we assume that individuals state the amount that is currently 
                                                 
6 Wilcox (1994, p.318) provides evidence that subjects search between the highest and the lowest outcome of 
a lottery to find their minimum selling price 
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compared to the lottery with probability θ  as price even if they are not indifferent between 
the amount and the lottery and the sequence of comparisons continues. Since it takes time 
to state a price, we expect that individuals do not state every amount that is compared to 
the lottery, i.e. that 1<θ . 
We run a Monte-Carlo simulation to analyze the predictions of the model. The set 
of possible prices SL is {0, 1, …, N-1}, where N is the number of prices on a grid for a 
corresponding lottery (cf. Table 1). The preferences of a representative individual are 
described by a normal distribution with mean equal to the expected value of a lottery 
(divided by a number of points on the price grid) and a standard deviation equal to 3 grid 
points.  If the individual prefers the amount (the lottery) then she decreases (increases) the 
amount by one before she makes the next comparison. We assume that after every 
comparison, the individual states the price that has been compared to the lottery with 
probability 0.1, i.e. θ=0.1. The parameters for γt are chosen to match the observed 
frequency of pricing patterns of different lengths (in particular γ1=0.2 and then it gradually 
increases). The values for x1 are drawn from a uniform distribution over the set of possible 
prices SL. For each of six lotteries used in the experiment we ran 600 Monte-Carlo 
simulations (recall that we used one representative subject for 60 experimental subjects).  
Price adjustment 
patterns 
Number of stated prices 
Total 
3 4 5 6 7 or more 
Monotone 35 (375) 17 (198) 3 (31) 3 (3) 0 (1) 58 (608) 
Oscillating 10 (113) 9 (24) 2 (3) 3 (0) 2 (0) 26 (140) 
Fine-tuning 17 (147) 14 (112) 7 (37) 0 (13) 0 (1) 38 (310) 
Weak fine-tuning - 16 (124) 10 (64) 6 (26) 1 (9) 33 (223) 
Jumping 2 (75) 6 (265) 8 (225) 7 (145) 11 (164) 34 (874) 
Total 64 (710) 62 (723) 30 (360) 19 (187) 14 (175) 189 (2155) 
Table 5 The frequency of price adjustment patterns in the experiment and in a Monte 
Carlo simulation of the model of stochastic pricing (in parentheses) 
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Table 5 compares the actual frequency of price adjustment patterns that we 
observed in the experiment and the corresponding frequency from a Monte Carlo 
simulation of the model of stochastic pricing. Table 5 clearly shows that the model of 
stochastic pricing matches the qualitative properties of price adjustment patterns that we 
observed in the experiment. In particular, we observe in a simulation that the frequency of 
monotone, oscillating, fine-tuning and weak fine-tuning price adjustment patterns 
decreases with the number of stated prices. The simulation also shows that while monotone 
pricing patterns are modal patterns in relatively short sequences (3-4 prices), jumping 
pricing patterns become modal patterns in relatively long sequences (5 and more prices). 
Thus, we can conclude that the model of stochastic pricing accommodates the empirical 
findings from our experiment. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper presents the results of a new experiment where subjects state their 
minimum selling prices for risky lotteries under time pressure. The novel feature of our 
experimental design is that we record price adjustments that subjects make before they 
settle on a final price (or the time for decision runs out). We observe that subjects make 
frequent and significant price adjustments within a short period of time. We classify all 
observed patterns of price adjustment into five categories: monotone, oscillating, fine-
tuning, weak fine-tuning and jumping. We show that random pricing models cannot 
explain the observed frequencies of these pricing patterns i.e. subjects do not make their 
adjustments at random. We also show that a model of stochastic pricing, where subjects 
search for their minimum selling price via a sequence of binary comparisons, qualitatively 
matches the experimental results. Thus, our experimental results suggest that people use 
simple procedural models to find their minimum selling price. 
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Let {p1,…,pn} be a vector of n distinct prices. Without loss of generality, assume 
that prices p1,…,pn are numbered in ascending order. Let {ai}i∈{1,…,n} denote a sequence of 
n prices that contains each of the prices p1,…,pn. Let An be the set of all such sequences. 
The set An has n! elements (the number of all possible combinations of prices p1,…,pn). 
Only two sequences in the set An are monotone: the ascending sequence a1<…<an and the 
descending sequence a1>…>an. Hence, the probability of observing a monotone sequence 
in the set An is 2/n!. 
A necessary condition for a fine-tuning sequence {ai}i∈{1,…,n} is that either a1=p1 
or a1=pn. Let )(nP F  be the probability that {ai} is a fine-tuning sequence. Then )(nP F  is 
equal to the probability that a1=p1 and that the sequence {ai}i∈{2,…,n} is either fine-tuning or 
descending plus the probability that a1=pn and that the sequence {ai}i∈{2,…,n} is either fine-
tuning or ascending. Therefore, )(nP F  can be written recursively as: 
(A1)   )(nP F =(2/n)( )1( −nP F +1/(n-1)!). 
Since 0)2( =FP , we can rewrite equation (A1) as  
!/)22(!/2...!/4!/2)( 12 nnnnnP nnF −=+++= −− . 
If neither a1=p1 nor a1=pn it must be the case that the sequence {ai}i∈{1,…,n} is 
jumping. Let )(nP J  be the probability of observing a jumping sequence in the set An. Then 
)(nP J  can be written recursively as:  
(A2)   )(nP J =(n-2)/n+(2/n) )1( −nP J . 
Since 0)2( =JP , we can rewrite the recursive equation (A2) as )(nP J =1-2n-1/n!. Q.E.D. 
Figure 3 Examples for pricing patterns (all pricing patterns are for lottery 2) 
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Weak Fine-Tuning Pricing Pattern (Subject 44, Lottery 2)
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Jumping Pricing Pattern (Subject 32, Lottery 2)
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
0 5 10 15 20 25
Time (sec)
Pr
ic
e
Ti
m
eo
ut
 
Translation of the instructions for the experiment. Text in italics did not appear in the 
instructions. 
 
Instructions for the Experiment 
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. 
 
This is an experiment in decision-making. The money to conduct this experiment has been 
provided by a research grant. We will ask you to answer 72 questions. 
 
At the end of the experiment, we will compute how much money you receive. 
Your payoff depends only on your decisions and on chance events. Your payoff does not 
depend on decisions of other participants. 
 
The experiment uses different lotteries. If you play a lottery, you receive a certain amount of 
money with some probability. With the remaining probability, you receive nothing. All 
lotteries have the following structure: 
 
 A box contains 100 cards. 
 28 cards are red. 
 72 cards are black. 
 If a red card is drawn, you earn 110 Swiss Francs. 
 If a black card is drawn, you earn nothing. 
 
 
At the end of the experiment appears a message on your screen that asks you to raise your 
hand to inform the experimenters that you have answered all questions. One of the 
experimenters will come by and ask you to complete a short questionnaire. Additionally, you 
will draw a number that determines which question is used to compute your payoff. 
Depending on how you answered this question, you will either receive a fixed amount or you 
will play a lottery. The actual payout happens in the room in front of the computer lab. If you 
play a lottery, you will be asked there to draw a card from the corresponding box. The color 
of the card determines whether you have won in the lottery. 
 
There is no such thing as a right or wrong answer.  
 
There are 5 different types of questions. We use colors to distinguish the different types of 
questions. Colors have no meaning except to distinguish the different types of questions. 
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Pink 
 
 
In a pink question you own the right to play a lottery and receive the outcome. However, you 
can sell the lottery. In these questions, we will ask you to choose the minimum price at which 
you are willing to sell the right to play the lottery from a list of prices. 
 
There are three differences compared to the lilac and green questions: 
(lilac  and green questions are lottery pricing tasks where payoffs are determined by the 
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure) 
 
1) You can not enter any price you want. Instead, you have to choose a price from the list 
of prices. 
2) You should choose a price quickly because otherwise it is possible that your payoff is 
zero. 
3) You can change the price as often as you want. 
 
 
On the computer screen, a pink question looks like this: 
  
 
 
 
Pink Questions are terminated after a randomly determined time (at the earliest after 10 
seconds, and not later than 30 seconds). If you did not click a price before the question is 
terminated, you will receive 0 Swiss Francs if this question is selected to determine your 
payoffs. 
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If you change your opinion about the minimum selling price before the question is terminated, 
you can click a new price from the list. You can change the price as often as you want. There 
is no penalty or reward if you change the price. 
 
If a pink question is selected to determine your payoffs, we will additionally draw a random 
amount between zero and the highest outcome of the lottery. The random amount will be 
compared with the last price that you entered before the question is terminated. If your price is 
higher than the amount that we have drawn, you will keep the lottery and your payoff is 
determined when you play the lottery. If your price is lower or equal to the amount that we 
have drawn, you will sell the lottery and receive the amount that we have drawn. 
 
 
At this point, the instructions contained a reference to explanation of a lottery pricing task 
under the standard Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure that was described earlier: 
 
Since your payoff is determined with the same method as in the lilac questions, it is also 
optimal in pink questions to enter the minimum price at which you are willing to sell the 
lottery. 
 
For the lilac questions, the explanation why it is optimal to state the minimum price at which 
you are willing to sell the lottery is as follows:  
 
Question: Is it indeed optimal for you to state truthfully the minimum price at which 
you are willing to sell the lottery? 
 
Answer: Yes 
 
Why? 
The price that you enter has no effect on the amount that you receive if you sell the lottery. 
Your price only determines in which cases you sell the lottery. It is optimal for you to sell the 
lottery if you receive at least as much as the lottery is worth to you. Hence it is optimal for 
you to enter the minimum price at which you are willing to sell the lottery. 
 
Example: 
Suppose that you are indifferent whether you play the lottery or receive 20 Swiss Francs. If 
you enter a price below 20 Francs (e.g., 15 Francs), it is possible that you sell the lottery for 
less than 20 Francs (e.g., 17 Francs). But since the lottery is worth 20 Francs to you, you 
would have been better off if you would have entered a higher price and would have kept the 
lottery. 
If you enter a price above 20 Francs (e.g., 25 Francs), it is possible that an amount between 20 
and 25 Francs is randomly drawn (e.g., 23 Francs). In this case, you would keep the lottery. 
But since the lottery is worth 20 Francs to you, you would have been better off if you would 
have entered a lower price and would have sold the lottery. 
 
Hence: It is optimal for you to enter the minimum price at which you are willing to sell 
the lottery. 
